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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The States adopt the government‘s jurisdictional statement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Congress‘s authority to regulate interstate commerce

includes the power to compel individuals to enter into commerce so that the federal
government may regulate them.
2.

Whether it is coercive for Congress to condition all existing federal

Medicaid funding ― billions of dollars representing approximately 40% of all
federal funding to the States ― on the States‘ acceptance of new expansions to the
Medicaid program.
3.

Whether the unconstitutional provisions are non-severable from the

remainder of the Act given their close relationship and the Government‘s repeated
insistence that the individual mandate is necessary for the Act‘s other insurance
reforms.
4.

Whether all or only some of the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge

the individual mandate.

1

INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is an extraordinary law that
rests on unprecedented assertions of federal power. In at least two respects, the
Act pushes even the most expansive conception of the federal government‘s
constitutional powers past the breaking point. First, the Act imposes a direct
mandate upon individuals to obtain health insurance, marking by all accounts the
first time in our Nation‘s history that Congress has required individuals to enter
into commerce as a condition of living in the United States.

The federal

government identifies no limiting principle that would prevent Congress from
employing that same power to force individuals to engage in any manner of
commerce so that the federal government may better regulate it. Instead, the
federal government embraces a sweeping view of the Commerce Clause — broad
enough to reach any subject and encompassing enough to include the power to
compel — that would imperil individual liberty, render Congress‘s other
enumerated powers superfluous, and allow Congress to usurp the general police
power reserved to the States.
Second, the Act‘s expansion of the Medicaid program is based on an equally
boundless interpretation of Congress‘s spending power, which would render any
remaining limits on Congress‘s enumerated powers illusory.

By piling new

conditions on enormous pre-existing blocks of federal grants — literally billions of
2

dollars — Congress has given the States no practical choice but to comply. No
meaningful assessment of the new marginal requirements is possible when the
consequences of non-acquiescence are the loss of such enormous sums. That is
true no matter how problematic the new requirements are and no matter how
intrusive on State prerogatives. To characterize such tactics as anything less than
coercion is to deny that spending legislation can ever be impermissibly coercive;
indeed, that is the government‘s position.
If this Court were to uphold those assertions of federal power, there would
remain little if any power ―reserved to the States … or to the people.‖ U.S. Const.
amend. X. Because that is plainly not the federal government that the Constitution
envisions, the district court correctly concluded that the Act is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a facial challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (―HCERA‖), Pub. L. No. 111-152 (collectively, ―the
ACA‖ or ―the Act‖). Plaintiffs are twenty-six States, two individuals, and the
National Federation of Independent Business. They brought this action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Act is invalid in its entirety
because four of its five core provisions exceed Congress‘s constitutional authority,
and none is severable from the rest of the Act.
3

Plaintiffs‘ second amended complaint included six causes of action; the
district court dismissed four. Record Excerpts (―R.E.‖) 1966–2000; 379–443. The
case proceeded to summary judgment on the two remaining claims: (1) that the
Act‘s mandate that each individual maintain a minimum level of health insurance
exceeds Congress‘s enumerated powers; and (2) that, as amended by the Act, the
Medicaid program is impermissibly coercive and therefore exceeds Congress‘s
spending power. The district court granted the Plaintiffs summary judgment on
their claim that Congress lacked authority to enact the individual mandate, but
granted the government summary judgment on the Plaintiffs‘ claim that the Act‘s
Medicaid amendments exceed Congress‘s spending authority. R.E. 2002–64.
The court also concluded that the individual mandate could not be severed
from the rest of the Act, and it therefore declared the Act invalid in its entirety.
R.E. 2064–75, 2080. The government filed a notice of appeal on March 8, 2011,
and the Plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal on March 10, 2011. R.E. 2149,
2152.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Affordable Care Act

The ACA is a 2,700-page collection of wide-ranging federal innovations
intended to impose ―near-universal‖ health insurance coverage on the Nation.
ACA § 1501(a)(1)(D). The Act has five central components: (1) a mandate that
4

nearly all individuals maintain a minimum level of insurance, ACA § 1501(b);
(2) the creation in each State of ―health benefit exchanges,‖ administered by either
the state or federal government, on which individuals and small businesses can
pool their purchasing power to obtain insurance, ACA § 1311; (3) a set of
mandates and incentives for employers, including the States, designed to require or
encourage the expansion of employer-sponsored insurance, ACA §§ 1001, 1511,
1513; (4) a substantial expansion of Medicaid eligibility and coverage, as well as
tax credits for insurance purchased by needier individuals, ACA §§ 2001, 1401,
1402; and (5) so-called ―guaranteed-issue reforms,‖ which prohibit insurers from
denying, canceling, capping, or increasing the cost of coverage based on an
individual‘s pre-existing conditions or history, ACA § 1001.
These appeals focus primarily on two of the Act‘s core provisions: the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.
1.

The Individual Mandate

The ACA mandates that each ―applicable individual shall for each month
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential
coverage for such month.‖ 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a). This mandate to maintain
health insurance applies to all individuals except foreign nationals residing here
unlawfully, incarcerated individuals, and individuals falling within two narrow
5

religious exemptions. Id. § 5000A(d). A covered individual who fails to comply
with the mandate is subject to a financial ―penalty.‖ Id. § 5000A(b)(1), (c).
2.

The Medicaid Expansion

Originally conceived in 1965, Medicaid was designed as a cooperative
program whereby Congress offered funding to any State that volunteered to
establish a health insurance plan for needy residents. See Social Security Act of
1965, Title XIX, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. At its inception, the program
covered approximately 4 million individuals and cost about $1 billion.

John

Klemm, Ph.D., Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 Health Care Fin. Rev. 105,
106 (Fall 2000). It has since expanded dramatically, and is now the single largest
federal grant-in-aid program to the States. Medicaid now accounts for more than
40% of all federal funds dispersed to the States — $251 billion in 2009 alone —
and approximately 7% of all federal spending.
Outlook,

June

2010,

CBO,

at

See The Long-Term Budget
7,

30,

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11579/06-30-LTBO.pdf; Budget of the
United States Government: State-by-State Tables Fiscal Year 2010, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/sheets/bis/8_3.xls.

The majority of

States receive at least $1 billion each year in federal Medicaid funding, which
covers at least half of each State‘s total Medicaid costs. R.E. 1551–55.

6

The ACA substantially expands the eligibility and coverage thresholds that
States must adopt and enforce to remain eligible to participate in Medicaid, as well
as the States‘ burdens and costs.

Whereas Medicaid previously gave States

substantial discretion in determining eligibility based on federal poverty levels, the
ACA requires States to provide Medicaid to individuals with incomes up to 133%
of the poverty level (with a 5% ―income disregard‖ provision that effectively raises
that number to 138%, HCERA § 1004(b)). ACA § 2001(a). Although the federal
government will initially fund 100% of the expanded benefits, the States are
responsible for significant administrative expenses; Congress also provided no
increased funding for the millions of individuals, who are currently eligible but not
enrolled, who will be forced into the program to comply with the individual
mandate. See R.E. 523-24, 573-74, 600-02, 613, 637, 643, 675, 705, 709, 792-94,
801-04. Moreover, by 2017, States will be responsible for 5% of the costs of the
new benefits, with that number increasing to 10% by 2020. HCERA § 1201.
The Act establishes a new ―minimum essential coverage‖ level that States
must provide to Medicaid recipients, thereby eliminating much of the flexibility
States previously possessed to determine what level of coverage to provide. ACA
§ 2001(a)(2). It also imposes a ―maintenance of effort‖ condition, which requires
that, until a State‘s approved health insurance exchange is fully operational, a State
―shall not have in effect eligibility standards, methodologies, or procedures … that
7

are more restrictive than [those] in effect on the date of enactment of the [ACA].‖
Id. § 2001(b). That requirement locks each State into its previously voluntary
coverage decisions, whatever they might have been. Finally, the Act requires the
States not only to pay the costs of care and services, but also to assume
responsibility for providing ―the care and services themselves.‖ ACA § 2304. The
added burdens, costs and liabilities from this new requirement — particularly in
the face of federal projections of severe provider shortages — are incalculable, but
sure to be substantial, underscoring that the ACA transforms Medicaid well
beyond anything the States volunteered to implement. In conjunction with these
expansions, the government predicts that federal Medicaid spending will increase
by another $434 billion by the end of the decade. R.E. 1425.
Congress did not impose the Act‘s additional Medicaid provisions as a
condition of accepting new federal funding. It instead conditioned each State‘s
entire federal Medicaid grant — on average, at least a billion dollars — on
adoption of the Act‘s substantial expansions of state obligations under the
program. R.E. 104; see also Julie Stone et al., Medicaid and the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Provisions in PPACA, Cong. Research Serv.,
April 28, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/healthcare/
medicaid/Documents/CRS%20Report%204_28_10.pdf (―the law requires states to
expand Medicaid‖).
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B.

District Court Proceedings

Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Plaintiffs brought this action
seeking a declaration that the ACA is unconstitutional.
1.

Motion to Dismiss

The district court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants‘ motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs‘ amended complaint. R.E. 379–443. The court rejected the
federal government‘s standing objections. R.E. 408–18. In doing so, the court
noted that the government did not challenge the States‘ standing to challenge the
ACA‘s amendments to Medicaid. R.E. 408.
Turning to the merits, the district court dismissed the States‘ Tenth
Amendment challenge to the mandate (as applied to the States) that employers
provide health insurance to employees, as well as the States‘ claim that the
provisions concerning health benefit exchanges commandeered state governments
in violation of the Tenth Amendment. R.E. 420–28. The court determined that
those claims were precluded by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
The district court denied the government‘s motion to dismiss the States‘
challenge to the individual mandate, noting that its decision was ―not even a close
call‖ given that ―[t]he power that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply
9

without prior precedent.‖ R.E. 439. The court also concluded that Congress
intended the penalty for violating the mandate to be a regulatory penalty, as
opposed to a tax subject to Congress‘s taxing authority. R.E. 385–407.
The district court further denied the government‘s motion to dismiss the
States‘ claim that the Medicaid amendments exceed Congress‘s authority to attach
conditions to the States‘ acceptance of federal funding. The court concluded that,
―[i]f the Supreme Court meant what it said in [South Dakota v.] Dole[, 483 U.S.
203, 211 (1987)] and Steward Machine Co. [v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)] ,
there is a line somewhere between mere pressure and impermissible coercion,‖ and
the ACA‘s requirement that States accept all changes to the Medicaid program as a
condition of receiving any federal Medicaid funds arguably fell on the
impermissibly coercive side of the line. R.E. 434.
2.

Motions for Summary Judgment

After the parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court
found that each of the individual Plaintiffs and the NFIB had standing to challenge
the individual mandate. It further found that at least two States (Idaho and Utah)
also had standing because the individual mandate conflicts with State laws
declaring that those States‘ citizens may not be compelled to obtain healthcare.
R.E. 2017–19. Thus, there was no ―need to discuss the standing issue with respect
to the other state plaintiffs, or the other asserted bases for standing.‖ R.E. 2019.
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On the merits, the district court noted that the individual mandate is an
unprecedented form of federal action — ―Never before has Congress required that
everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being
alive and residing in the United States.‖ R.E. 2039. The court explained that ―an
‗absence of power‘ might reasonably be inferred where — as here — ‗earlier
Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power.‘‖ R.E. 2040 (quoting
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 908 (1997)).
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the district court determined, ―some
type of already-existing activity or undertaking‖ is a ―prerequisite to the exercise
of the commerce power.‖ R.E. 2044. Congress therefore cannot ―penalize a
passive individual for failing to engage in commerce.‖ R.E. 2043. If Congress
could do so, the court concluded, ―the enumeration of powers in the Constitution
would have been in vain for it would be ‗difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power.‘‖ R.E. 2043 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
(1995)).
Applying those principles, the court determined that the individual mandate
―regulates inactivity,‖ that is, it applies to every person ―who ‗fails‘ to act pursuant
to the congressional dictate‖ to obtain health insurance. R.E. 2045. The court
rejected the defendants‘ argument that ―unique‖ features of the health care market
justify treating the ―mere status of being without health insurance‖ as economic
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activity. R.E. 2051. The court reasoned that while ―every market problem is, at
some level and in some respects, unique,‖ the purported uniqueness of the problem
does not justify a solution that exceeds Congress‘s enumerated powers. R.E. 2050.
Moreover, the court found that the supposedly unique features of the health care
market — that every individual is susceptible to illness or injury and that the costs
of care are sometimes shifted to others — are not unique because one or both of
these properties exist in other markets for basic goods and services such as food,
transportation, and housing.

R.E. 2047–49.

The court also rejected the

defendants‘ argument that Congress can regulate the ―decision‖ not to purchase
health insurance, concluding that authority to regulate mere decisions not to
engage in activity ―would essentially have unlimited application.‖ R.E. 2054.
The district court further held that the individual mandate could not be
justified as a ―necessary and proper‖ means of executing Congress‘s power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate insurance companies‘ underwriting practices.
The individual mandate is not an ―appropriate‖ means of achieving that goal, the
court held, because it would undermine the ―‗essential attributes‘ of the Commerce
Clause limitations on the federal government‘s power,‖ such that it is ―neither
within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution.‖ R.E. 2063. The court also
observed that the government‘s reasoning that the individual mandate was
necessary to counteract the incentives created by other federal policies would
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―have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more
dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or ‗necessary‘ the
statutory fix.‖ R.E. 2061.
Turning to Medicaid, the district court granted the Defendants summary
judgment on the States‘ coercion claim. R.E. 2007-14. Notwithstanding its earlier
acknowledgement that Dole and Steward Machine recognize a line between
pressure and coercion, the court concluded that it would be too difficult to
distinguish between pressure and coercion. R.E. 2009.
Finally, the court concluded that the individual mandate cannot be severed
from the rest of the Act. The court first noted that, in light of the government‘s
concession that ―the individual mandate and the Act‘s health insurance reforms …
will rise or fall together,‖ ―the only question is whether the Act‘s other, non-healthinsurance-related provisions can stand independently.‖ R.E. 2064-65.
Examining Congress‘s intent, the court found it significant that a severability
clause ―had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but … was removed in
the bill that subsequently became law.‖ R.E. 2068. The court next found the
government‘s concession that the Act‘s insurance reforms must fall with the
mandate ―extremely significant because the various insurance provisions, in turn,
are the very heart of the Act itself.‖ R.E. 2069. Examining the remainder of the
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Act, the court concluded that, because of the inter-relatedness of the Act‘s various
provisions, ―[i]t would be impossible to ascertain on a section-by-section basis if
any particular statutory provision could stand (and was intended by Congress to
stand) independent of the individual mandate,‖ and trying do so would ―be
tantamount to rewriting a statute in an attempt to salvage it.‖ R.E. 2074.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Gulf
Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The individual mandate is an unprecedented assertion of a power
Congress simply does not possess. Congress has substantial power to regulate
interstate commerce, but it may not compel individuals to enter into such
commerce so that Congress may better regulate them. In the over 200 years that
Congress has sat, it has never before attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause
power in this manner. That is not the product of remarkable restraint; Congress
has not exercised such a power because it does not exist. Instead, the Commerce
Clause has always been understood as granting Congress authority ―to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed,‖ Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196
(1824), not to create or compel that commerce in the first instance. Upholding
Congress‘s novel assertion of authority to conscript individuals into commerce, or
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indeed into any activity that substantially affects commerce, would eliminate any
meaningful limit on Congress‘s enumerated powers and effectively destroy the
Constitution‘s careful balance.
The government makes no attempt to identify the outer limits of its newly
found authority, but instead emphasizes that the health care market is unique.
Uniqueness is hardly a source of legal authority, and neither the insurance market
nor the broader health care market is unique. Plenty of individuals rationally
decide to self-insure, wholly apart from any disincentives created by federal law.
And, in contrast to markets for basic necessities like food and shelter, it is not
inevitable that every individual will ultimately participate in the health care
market.

In any event, the government‘s argument that most individuals will

someday participate in the health care market does not permit Congress to regulate
all individuals now.
The government similarly fails to differentiate the health care market from
other markets by pointing to the potential for ―cost-shifting.‖ Cost-shifting is an
inherent aspect of many markets in which the government chooses to subsidize
costs. Indeed, cost-shifting is so ubiquitous that the Supreme Court has already
rejected as boundless the argument that Congress may justify legislation otherwise
outside its Commerce Clause power on that basis. See United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 563–64 (1995).

Neither the health care market nor cost-shifting
15

concerns are unique; what is unique is the individual mandate‘s compulsion of
commercial activity.

However, if this court upholds the ACA, this heretofore

unexercised power will soon become ubiquitous.
Nor is the individual mandate justified by resort to the Necessary and Proper
Clause. When a law‘s principal Commerce Clause defect is that it grants Congress
a police power reserved to the States, pointing to the additional power conferred by
the Necessary and Proper Clause is a non sequitur. A law that is not consistent
with the ―letter and spirit‖ of the Constitution is not a ―proper‖ means of executing
an enumerated power. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). The
individual mandate cannot be reconciled with the Constitution‘s structural
protections or the Framers‘ conscious choice to give Congress only limited and
enumerated powers.

The individual mandate cannot be justified as a modest

provision incidental to the remainder of the ACA; instead, it is the very centerpiece
of the Act. It is also one of the Act‘s principal threats to individual liberty and the
States‘ unique role in a true system of dual sovereignty.
The mandate is equally indefensible as an exercise of Congress‘s taxing
power, for the simple reason that the mandate is not a tax; it is a requirement that
individuals engage in particular conduct.
II. The ACA‘s dramatic expansion of States‘ obligations and liabilities
under Medicaid is not a valid exercise of Congress‘s spending power. Although
16

Congress may use the promise of federal funds to persuade a State to adopt federal
conditions voluntarily, the Supreme Court has long ―recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive
as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖ Dole, 483 U.S. at
211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590). Unless that doctrine is to be
abandoned, the ACA far surpasses that point. The Act conditions all of the States‘
federal Medicaid funding — billions of dollars — upon acceptance of the ACA‘s
expanded Medicaid eligibility and coverage provisions. Accordingly, the only
means by which a State may avoid the ACA‘s substantial new burdens is by
withdrawing entirely from the Medicaid program, which is simply not possible
given the amount of money at stake. Congress itself recognized as much by
providing no means other than Medicaid through which the neediest individuals
might comply with the individual mandate.
Rather than attempt to explain how the ACA complies with the coercion
doctrine, the district court instead appears to have deemed coercion a political
question not subject to meaningful judicial supervision. However, the notion that
coercion claims are nonjusticiable cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court‘s
repeated recognition that the coercion doctrine does exist, or with the Court‘s
adjudication on the merits of every coercion claim that has reached it.
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III. As the district court correctly concluded, the ACA cannot survive the
invalidation of its central individual mandate and the reforms directly tied to it.
The government argues that some unidentifiable portion of the Act‘s 450 other
provisions — provisions carefully calibrated to either fund or be funded by those
central reforms — should nonetheless be left in place. In doing so, the government
ignores the central question in the severability analysis, namely, ―whether the
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress‖ once the
unconstitutional portions have been severed. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480
U.S. 678, 685 (1987). Without the individual mandate and its accompanying
insurance reforms, the remnants of the ACA could not function in the manner
Congress intended.
Finally, the district court correctly included all Plaintiffs in its declaratory
judgment. The States have demonstrated standing to challenge the individual
mandate in at least three respects: (1) they are injured by its requirement that
millions more individuals enroll in Medicaid; (2) they are injured by the Act‘s
other insurance reforms, from which the mandate cannot be severed; and (3) they
are injured by the mandate‘s intrusion upon their sovereignty.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Individual Mandate Exceeds Congress’s Authority To Regulate
Interstate Commerce.
Simply for being alive, an individual, by federal directive, must purchase

qualifying health insurance, or to have it purchased by an employer on their behalf.
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d), (f). By attempting to compel people to participate
in commerce, the individual mandate far exceeds the federal government‘s
Commerce Clause authority to ―regulate commerce.‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(emphasis added). Permitting Congress to force citizens to engage in commerce all
the better to regulate them is simply not compatible with a system of enumerated
and limited powers or a system of dual sovereignty. Sanctioning such a power
would eliminate all meaningful limits on Congress‘s authority and sound the death
knell for our constitutional structure and individual liberties.
A.

The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not Include the Power
To Compel Individuals To Engage in Commerce.
1.

The constitutional text and precedent are clear that the
power to regulate commerce does not include the power to
compel commerce.

The Constitution grants Congress authority to ―regulate‖ interstate
commerce. Dating all the way back to Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly confirmed that, consistent with its plain meaning, ―the power to
regulate‖ is the power ―to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed.‖

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
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Thus, commerce ―is

regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on [commercial] intercourse,‖ id. at 190
— not by forcing anyone to carry on such intercourse in the first place. Justice
Field similarly explained that ―[t]he power to regulate [interstate] commerce … is
the power to prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed, that is, the
conditions upon which it shall be conducted.‖

Gloucester Ferry Co. v.

Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885); see also City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel.
Co., 149 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1893).
Even as the challenges of economic modernization have caused the Supreme
Court to expand the traditional meaning of ―interstate commerce,‖ see United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554–56 (1995), the Court has never questioned that
the power to ―regulate‖ commerce is the power to prescribe rules to govern preexisting, voluntary conduct. Indeed the very breadth of modern Commerce Clause
doctrine is what makes so alarming the federal government‘s claim that if it may
regulate conduct, it may also compel it. There are now ―three general categories of
regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power.‖
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005). Congress may regulate (1) the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) ―activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.‖ Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. In the third
20

category, Congress may regulate purely ―intrastate activity‖ that is ―economic in
nature‖ and that, viewed in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at
559–61; Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
Each of these categories presupposes a pre-existing voluntary activity to be
regulated. In particular, the third category — the one at issue in this case, see
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 24–25 — requires that the congressional regulation be
directed at commercial or economic ―activity.‖ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. The
government‘s own brief is replete with references to regulated ―activity‖ or
―conduct‖ precisely because those terms are ubiquitous in the case law. See, e.g.,
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29.
Regulation of intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce is already at the edge of the Commerce Clause authority because it does
not directly regulate interstate commerce itself. Because broad regulation of such
intrastate activities creates tension with our federalist system, the courts must resist
―additional expansion‖ of that third category. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68;
accord id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). That makes the ―activity‖ limitation
crucial, because without it that third category would lose any claim to be grounded
in the Constitution. Congress would no longer be regulating interstate commerce
or even activities that substantially affect interstate commerce ― instead, it would
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be reaching out to compel private conduct where there had been no activity, and
thus not effect interstate commerce.
Moreover, Congress‘s ―plenary‖ regulatory authority over matters within the
scope of its commerce power, see Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197, is strong evidence that
Congress may not drag unwilling individuals within the scope of that power.
Congress has ―direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject‖ of
interstate commerce and therefore ―has power to pass laws for regulating the
subjects specified, in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals
[in] respect thereof.‖ Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883). Indeed, Congress
has ―full control‖ of ―the subjects committed to its regulation.‖ North Am. Co. v.
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (quoting Minn. Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard),
230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)). If the Constitution gave Congress authority to draft
individuals not just for military service, but for any activity directly affecting
interstate commerce, and then to exercise full control over them, the Framers
surely would have proposed far more protections in the Bill of Rights or rejected
this dangerous new power altogether. But they did neither, precisely because the
commerce power was not some vortex of authority that rendered the entire process
of enumeration beside the point. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (the commerce power ―seems to be an
addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained‖).
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2.

Congress has never before attempted to use the Commerce
Clause to compel private commercial activity.

The absence of historical precedent for the exercise of such an extraordinary
authority is revealing; if Congress actually possessed this power, it is doubtful that
it would have taken two centuries to exercise it.

When ―earlier Congresses

avoided use of‖ a ―highly attractive power,‖ that avoidance is ―reason to believe
that the power was thought not to exist.‖ Printz, 521 U.S. at 905; see also Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743–44 (1999).
Congress‘s own legal advisers have repeatedly confirmed that there is no
historical precedent for this asserted power.

In 1994, the nonpartisan

Congressional Budget Office observed that a ―mandate requiring all individuals to
purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action.‖
CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate To Buy Health
Insurance 1 (1994) [hereinafter ―CBO Report‖]. The CBO explained that the
federal government ―has never required people to buy any good or service as a
condition of lawful residence in the United States.‖ Id. Rather, Congress has
generally limited itself to imposing ―[f]ederal mandates‖ that ―apply to people as
parties to economic transactions.‖ Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Similarly, during the debate over the current version of the individual
mandate, the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service advised that ―[d]espite
the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the Commerce Clause,‖ it is
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―a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to
purchase a good or service.‖

CRS, Requiring Individuals To Obtain Health

Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (2009).

And while differing on the

constitutional bottom line, courts have uniformly agreed that the individual
mandate is unprecedented. See Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp.
2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d
882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at
*18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
The absence of prior Commerce Clause legislation mandating private
activity is not for lack of a motive; Congress previously declined to exercise that
power even in situations where it obviously would have been expedient. For
example, when it became evident that ―relatively few individuals‖ were voluntarily
purchasing flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572, Congress made the purchase of flood insurance a
prerequisite for participation in certain voluntary economic transactions. See 42
U.S.C. § 4012a(a) (no federal financial assistance for acquisition or construction of
a building without flood insurance); id. § 4012a(b)(1) (federally regulated lenders
may not make loans secured by property without flood insurance). How much
simpler to directly compel the purchase of such insurance; yet Congress never
mandated the purchase of flood insurance by everyone in the flood plain.
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The very same arguments the government is now making in defense of the
individual mandate to purchase health insurance would have applied with equal
force to a flood insurance mandate: Most individuals living in flood hazard areas
will suffer flood-related losses at some point (participants in the flood-victim
market in the government‘s locution), and those losses are likely to be distributed
throughout society by mechanisms such as governmental disaster relief. That
Congress did not mandate the purchase of flood insurance by persons living in
flood plains, despite the obvious practical benefits of doing so, strongly suggests
that Congress thought it lacked that power.
Similarly, a power to compel commerce would be particularly attractive
during a recession, when congressional efforts to stimulate the economy are often
frustrated by individuals‘ decisions to save rather than spend. See Edmund L.
Andrews, Economists See a Limited Boost from the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2009, at A1. How much better for the long-run deficit and the short-term economy
to mandate spending by individuals; yet Congress instead tinkered with different
mechanisms for encouraging individuals voluntarily to spend more. See Michael
Cooper, From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard Of, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010,
at A1 (reporting that in light of ―evidence that people were more likely to save than
spend the tax rebate checks they received,‖ Congress ―arranged for less money to

25

be withheld from people‘s paychecks‖). Indeed, even during the Great Depression
and two world wars, the government did not claim such a power.
The government‘s effort to dig up counter-examples under the Commerce
Clause only confirms that there are none:
The government cites the Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271,
which required ―each and every free able-bodied white male citizen‖
between 18 and 45 years of age to ―be enrolled in the militia‖ and to
obtain, ―within six months thereafter,‖ a firearm, ammunition, and other
military equipment. See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 44; see also Parker v. Dist.
of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 386–87 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Congress enacted
that requirement pursuant to its power to ―provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the militia,‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16, not its power
to ―regulate commerce,‖ id. cl. 3. Moreover, the arming requirement did
not apply to every individual in the United States, only to those ―enrolled
in the militia.‖
The government points to the provision of the Emergency Banking Relief
Act of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 2, authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to require all persons ―to pay and deliver to the Treasurer of the
United States any or all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates‖
owned by them. See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 44 (citing Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935)). Congress passed that provision pursuant to
its power ―to provide a currency for the whole country‖ and to ―put out of
existence … a circulation in competition with notes issued by the
government.‖ Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 543 (1871); see also
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. See Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 294
U.S. 240, 302–03 (1935).
The government cites the Endangered Species Act, the Federal Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, and federal child pornography laws. Govt.‘s
Opening Br. 44. Each of these federal statutes prohibits private conduct
— taking a species, blocking a clinic, or possessing child pornography.
None compels unwilling individuals to engage in commercial or
economic activity.
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If anything, the government‘s examples only confirm that ―[f]ederal
mandates that apply to individuals as members of society are extremely rare,‖ CBO
Report at 2, and non-existent under the Commerce Clause. The ―numerousness‖ of
federal statutes regulating voluntary commercial and economic activity,
―contrasted with the utter lack of statutes‖ mandating such activity, is compelling
evidence of the ―assumed absence of such power.‖ Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-08.
B.

The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not Authorize the
Lifelong Regulation of Every Citizen on the Ground that Most
Will, at Some Point, Engage in Commerce in the Future.

Under correct legal principles, Congress‘s findings underlying the Act are
plainly insufficient, and the government does not suggest otherwise. Congress
found that the mandate itself ―is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce.‖ ACA § 1501(a)(1). That focus on
regulatory impact, rather than pre-existing commercial activity only underscores
the absence of constitutional authority under correct legal standards — instead of
regulating activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce, Congress
apparently considered it sufficient that the regulation itself would have such
effects. Requiring everyone to buy an airplane would certainly have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, but that hardly brings such a mandate within
Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority. Congress also found that the ―decision‖
not to purchase a product, such as health insurance, is itself ―economic activity.‖
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ACA § 1501(a)(2)(A). But treating a mental process as the relevant ―activity‖ only
underscores the absence of actual activity and the troubling lack of a limiting
principle.
Rather than defend those congressional findings, the government claims that
the individual mandate is actually a regulation of future commercial or economic
activity in which, the government presumes, most individuals subject to the
mandate will ultimately engage. This argument finds no support in precedent and
has astonishing implications for federalism and individual liberty.
1.

It is not inevitable that everyone will purchase health
insurance or consume health care services.

The government‘s argument proceeds in three steps. First, it identifies a
broad national market for ―health care services.‖ Govt.‘s Opening Br. 26. As
defined, this market encompasses a wide variety of goods and services, including
hospital care; physician and clinical services; other professional services (e.g.,
dentistry, chiropractic, mental health); prescription and over-the-counter drugs; and
medical equipment such as eyeglasses and hearing aids. See Centers For Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights, at 1 (2011),
cited in Govt.‘s Opening Br. 7. The size of this market in 2009 was $2.5 trillion,
more than one-sixth of the nation‘s gross domestic product. Id. Second, the
government claims that ―[v]irtually all‖ citizens participate in this broadly defined
market. Id. at 16; see also id. at 37–38. Third, the government contends that
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Congress may impose on all citizens a requirement to purchase health insurance as
a means of ―regulat[ing]‖ the way those citizens ―pay for services in the interstate
health care market.‖ Id. at 25–26.
The government‘s theory boils down to the claim that if it can identify an
―interstate market‖ in a broadly defined commodity, such as ―health care services,‖
that most individuals will need to consume at some point in their lives, it can then
regulate everyone at every moment of their lives, from cradle to grave, as if they
were at that very moment active participants in the interstate market in question.
That is troubling and far too broad. Just as ―depending on the level of generality,
any activity can be looked upon as commercial,‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565, the
government‘s theory shows that, depending on the level of generality, anyone, no
matter how dormant, could be looked at (under the government‘s approach) as
participating in a market.
In the first place, as the government seemed to recognize below, the relevant
market here is insurance, not health care. The individual mandate does not force
participation in the health care market or even mandate the use of insurance once
purchased. Instead, it forces people to pay now for health care that they may or
may not receive at some point in the future. But many people voluntarily decide to
forego the purchase of health insurance, and many do so for reasons having
nothing to do with the incentives created by other federal programs.
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The government attempts to distinguish health insurance on the ground that
everyone will participate in the health care market at some point. But that is not
strictly true, and does not render the market unique. The government does not, and
cannot, contend that all these individuals will necessarily participate in the health
care market (much less that they will all fail to pay for any services). Some will
not participate due to religious scruples or individual circumstances. Indeed even
the government concedes that participation in the health care market is not truly
universal, as it feels the need to qualify its still-expansive claim that ―[v]irtually all
Americans participate‖ in the health care market. And participation in the health
care market is not as truly universal as participation in the market for basic
necessities, like food and clothing.
Moreover, the government cites no statistics whatsoever that would show
that all uninsured individuals that receive medical care do not pay for the care,
even though that is the key economic problem the individual mandate is supposed
to address. The number of such persons is obviously significantly lower than the
number of uninsured individuals who receive any medical care, since many healthy
individuals make a rational choice to self-insure and are fully capable of paying for
the care they receive. According to the government‘s own statistics, uninsured
persons pay 37% of their health care costs out of pocket, and third parties pay for

30

another 26% of those costs on their behalf. See Families USA, Hidden Health Tax:
Americans Pay a Premium, at 22, 6, cited in Gov‘t Opening Br. 10, 11.
The government argues that ―Congress need not show that every uninsured
person, or which uninsured persons, will receive uncompensated care,‖ but can
instead consider the ―cumulative impact‖ of such care on interstate commerce.
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 27.

This argument severely misunderstands the role of

aggregation in Commerce Clause analysis.

Under Supreme Court precedent,

consideration of the aggregate impact of an economic activity on interstate
commerce allows congressional regulation to reach individual instances of that
economic activity that do not, by themselves, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 559–61. But aggregation does not allow congressional regulation to reach
individuals who are not engaged in that economic activity — much less individuals
who never will be.

Thus, aggregation allows Congress to regulate a single

farmer‘s apparently de minimus production of a nationally marketed commodity.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942). But it would not
justify a law requiring others to produce or purchase that commodity.
According to the government, the relevant economic activity is the ―practice
of consuming health care services without insurance.‖ Govt.‘s Opening Br. 28. At
most, therefore, Supreme Court precedent allows Congress to regulate that activity
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— for example, by imposing restrictions or penalties on individuals who attempt to
consume health care services without insurance. But that does not give Congress
carte blanche to compel participation in that activity.
Moreover, even if it were permissible (it is not) for Congress to adopt a false
presumption that every individual will participate in the health care market at some
point in time, Congress still would not have the power to force individuals into the
market at other times. An individual becomes subject to regulation only at the
point at which the individual engages in a ―commercial transaction‖ or other
―economic activity‖ in or substantially affecting interstate commerce. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 560–61. The Court has never held commercial regulation justified based
on a mere likelihood of economic activity at some unknown, perhaps distant, point
in the future.
2.

Exercising regulatory authority over everyone on the theory
that most people will eventually engage in an activity would
impermissibly give Congress an unbounded police power.

The government‘s novel theory — that Congress may exercise its plenary
commerce power over all individuals at all times based on the likelihood that most
citizens will participate in a broadly defined national market at some time — fails
for the additional reason that it would vastly expand congressional power at the
expense of States and our system of dual federalism. The ―Constitution created a
Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power
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to the States.‖ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the ―scope of
the interstate commerce power ‗must be considered in light of our dual system of
government, and may not be extended so as to … obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.‘‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). In particular, the Commerce Clause may not be
read to grant the federal government ―a general police power.‖ Id. at 567; see also
id. at 564.
But that is precisely what the government‘s theory would do.

Every

individual would be at all times subject to federal regulation of his or her private
decisions related to health care or anything else that substantially affects interstate
commerce (which it to say, almost everything). There is no logical reason why
such regulation would have to be limited to the decision whether to purchase health
insurance. Congress could regulate other decisions bearing on an individual‘s
supposed ―active participation in the health care market,‖ such as whether to have
an annual physical or to undertake certain courses of treatment.

The federal

government‘s interest in controlling the cost of health care would likewise give
Congress authority to order individuals to eat more vegetables and fewer desserts,
to exercise at least 45 minutes per day, to sleep at least eight hours per day, and to
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drink one glass of wine a day but never any beer. Congress could rationally
conclude that such mandates would control healthcare costs more directly, and
perhaps more effectively, than ordering people to pay for services in a particular
way.
Even apart from health care, most citizens participate in a number of
interstate markets at some point in their lives, including markets for housing, food,
clothing, education, and transportation. Indeed, the need for food and clothing is at
least as pressing and ubiquitous as health care.

By the government‘s logic,

Congress could legislate as if all citizens were participants in those interstate
markets at all times, and tell them what type of housing, food, and clothing to
consume, and how to pay for them.

Cf. R.E. 2048 (noting that government

counsel, when questioned, did not foreclose the possibility that Congress could
require people to buy cars).
This is precisely the sort of limitless reading of the Commerce Clause that
the Supreme Court has foreclosed. So long as the commerce power is ―subject to
outer limits,‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, it cannot be invoked to justify the imposition
of a cradle-to-grave regulatory regime on all or nearly all individuals in the United
States.
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3.

“Cost-shifting” is neither unique to the health care context
nor a basis for departing from fundamental constitutional
precepts.

The government suggests that ―cost-shifting‖ is a ―unique‖ feature that
distinguishes the health care services market from other markets and justifies the
especially intrusive regulation represented by the individual mandate. See Govt.‘s
Opening Br. 34–37.

But uniqueness is not a talisman that justifies the

government‘s use of unconstitutional means; if anything, the government‘s
repeated emphasis on purported uniqueness only underscores its lack of a viable
legal theory. And as noted above, the only thing that is really unique here is
Congress‘s unprecedented attempt to use its authority to regulate commerce as a
basis for conscripting people into participating in commerce.
Cost-shifting is certainly not unique to this context. It is an inherent aspect
of many markets due to the frequent availability of ―‗backstops‘ provided by law,
including bankruptcy protection and other government-funded financial assistance
and services.‖ R.E. 2055; see also R.E. 2049. On the same rationale, therefore,
the government could require everyone to adopt arguably prudent practices to
protect their financial status, as well as that of their dependents, by, for example:
maintaining minimum levels of life insurance; avoiding risky investments; and not
incurring more than a certain amount of debt. Similarly, because the eventual need
for burial or cremation services is at least as likely as the need for health care, the
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government would evidently assert authority to require everyone to pre-pay for a
coffin or urn, to avoid shifting costs onto the public.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar cost-shifting and insurance rationale in
Lopez and Morrison.

In Lopez, the government argued that Congress could

regulate violent crime under the commerce power because ―the costs of violent
crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are
spread throughout the population.‖ 514 U.S. at 563–64. The Court reasoned that
under this cost-shifting and insurance rationale, ―Congress could regulate not only
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of
how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.‖ Id. at 564. Morrison similarly
rejected the government‘s argument that gender-motivated violence affects
interstate commerce by, among other things, ―increasing medical and other costs.‖
529 U.S. at 615.
The cost-shifting and insurance rationale is even weaker here insofar as the
government would apply it to almost all Americans solely for being alive, not only
to people who engage in specific targeted activities. And unlike violent crime, the
cost-shifting problem is also of Congress‘s making — Congress made the decision
to guarantee free healthcare to uninsured individuals through the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. It is
absurd for the government to argue that Congress‘s decision to make healthcare
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available for free gives it authority to force everyone to pre-pay for that service
(regardless of whether they ever use or want it).1
For that reason, the Government‘s repeated citation of Justice Kennedy‘s
Lopez concurrence for the proposition that ―principles of economic practicality‖
govern is at best ironic. Gov‘t Br. 43. The practicality here is that ―[t]he statute
before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional
assertion of the commerce power.‖

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).
C.

The Individual Mandate Is Not a Necessary and Proper Means of
Executing the Commerce Power.

The government nonetheless argues that the individual mandate is justified
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But even that ―last, best hope of those
who defend ultra vires congressional action,‖ Printz, 521 U.S. at 923, cannot be
stretched so far.

The government tries to portray Congress as having bowed to a ―societal
judgment‖ that uninsured individuals should be guaranteed free medical care,
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 36, apparently in an effort to soften the blow of its implication
that Congress can expand its own authority over individuals by offering them
gratuitous benefits and then demanding pre-payment. There is, however, no
indication that Congress‘s decision to offer free medical care was based on a
stronger ―societal judgment‖ than that which underlies any other democratically
enacted legislation. And if anything distinguishes the judgment reflected by
EMTALA, it is that it implicates issues squarely within the reserved power of the
States.
1
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As the Supreme Court has long held, a law that is inconsistent with the
―letter and spirit‖ of the Constitution is not a ―proper‖ means of executing an
enumerated power. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. The Court has also made clear
that when a law violates fundamental constitutional principles, ―it is not a
‗La[w] … proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,‘ and is thus,
in the words of the Federalist, ‗merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation‘ which ‗deserve[s]
to be treated as such.‘‖ Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 733–34 (same). One such principle, which is
―deeply ingrained in our constitutional history,‖ is that the ―Constitution created a
Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power
to the States.‖ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 155)
(internal quotation marks omitted). These ―precepts of federalism embodied in the
Constitution inform which powers are properly exercised by the National
Government‖ under the Necessary and Proper Clause. United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
As explained above, the individual mandate would violate the fundamental
constitutional principle that the federal government is one ―of limited powers.‖
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8. It is far from ―Proper‖ to eviscerate that basic
constitutional precept.
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Moreover, the mandate is not ―incidental‖ (McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411) to
some other legitimate regulation under the Commerce Clause. Congress sought to
―increase the number and share of Americans who are insured,‖ ACA
§ 1501(a)(2)(C), and it did so by the most direct route available: requiring them to
be insured. Thus, this is not a means to some legitimate end, but an end in itself.
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress may not invoke the Necessary and
Proper Clause to exercise any ―great substantive and independent power,‖ only
powers that are ―incidental to those powers which are expressly given‖ and that
―subserve the legitimate objects of‖ the federal government. McCulloch, 17 U.S.
at 411. But the power exercised here is distinct from any Commerce Clause power
ever exercised and

could not have been granted without prompting

contemporaneous objection.

The fundamental problem is that Congress has

invoked a power that it was not granted under the Commerce Clause, the
Necessary and Proper Clause or anywhere else.
The government also contends that the individual mandate is incidental to
―the requirement that insurers extend coverage and set premiums without regard to
pre-existing medical conditions.‖ Govt.‘s Opening Br. 28. The government insists
that this requirement ―would not work without‖ the individual mandate because the
requirement will encourage consumers to refrain from buying insurance until they
are injured or sick. Id. at 30–31; see ACA § 1501(a)(2)(G). But on this reasoning,
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the individual mandate is designed not to ―subserve‖ and facilitate the Act‘s
insurance industry reforms, McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411, but to counteract their
anticipated negative consequences.
As the district court correctly recognized, the government‘s reasoning would
mean that ―the more harm [a] statute does, the more power Congress could assume
for itself under the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖ R.E. 2061. The Constitution
does not permit this type of blatant bootstrapping ― create a problem and then
assert that it is necessary and proper to fix the problem by asserting an authority
the Constitution otherwise denies the federal government.

Moreover, the

individual mandate is the centerpiece of the Act, as the government has repeatedly
stressed, not a collateral provision or distinct means to some other end.

As

discussed below, the government‘s arguments about the necessity of the individual
mandate to the ACA‘s other provisions show that the Act is not severable; but they
hardly increase Congress‘s authority to enact those measures in the first place.
The multi-factor inquiry used by the Supreme Court in its most recent
exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that the individual
mandate is not necessary and proper. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1949. Comstock
upheld a civil-commitment statute for prisoners with certain mental health issues
after considering four contextual factors, none of which supports invocation of that
Clause here.
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While there was a ―long history of federal involvement‖ in prison-related
mental health statutes, id., there is no history of the federal government mandating
the purchase of health insurance (or any other commodity).

Similarly, the

individual mandate is not ―reasonably adapted‖ to Congress‘s ―responsibilities.‖
Id. at 1961–62. Unlike Comstock, where the common law imposed obligations on
the government as custodian, the federal government has no legal duty to
undertake the unprecedented step of providing or mandating health care to
everyone legally in the country.
Nor does the individual mandate have only a ―narrow‖ scope. Id. at 1949,
1364-65; cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (―the question of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause is ‗necessarily one of degree‘‖) (citation omitted). It applies
to almost everyone legally living in the United States, solely because they live in
the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d).
The individual mandate certainly does not ―accommodat[e] state interests‖
by leaving them any choice in the matter, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962; instead, it
overrides state interests in favor of a one-size-fits-all federal mandate, even in
those States like Idaho, Utah, and Virginia that have enacted laws expressly
guaranteeing their citizens the freedom to choose not to purchase health insurance.
See Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9003; Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2505.5; Va. Code.
Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1.
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The manner in which the individual mandate runs roughshod over state
interests is particularly egregious given that protection of the public health lies at
the core of the States‘ traditional police power. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963). The lack of any limiting principle on this
power and the reality that it amounts to a federal police power vitiates any reliance
on the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (―Nor need
we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general ‗police power, which
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.‘‖ (quoting
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618). When, as here, the fundamental problem with the
federal government‘s Commerce Clause theory is the lack of a limiting principle,
its resort to the Necessary and Proper Clause to augment that power, and make it
more like a federal police power is a non-sequitur. Unlike Comstock, or any other
case on which the government relies,2 this is a case in which ―the National
Government relieves the States of their own primary responsibility to enact laws
and policies for the safety and well being of their citizens‖ and ―the exercise of

This suffices to distinguish not only Comstock but precedents of this Court that
rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to effectuate a
government policy that depends on a more customary exercise of the Commerce
power. But when the problem is that the Commerce Clause power asserted has no
limits, pointing to additional authorities that augment the Commerce Clause is nonresponsive.
2
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national power intrudes upon functions and duties traditionally committed to the
State.‖ Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
D.

The Individual Mandate Is Not a Valid Exercise of Congress’s
Taxing Power.

The government briefly argues that even if the individual mandate is not a
valid exercise of Congress‘s commerce power, it is nonetheless a valid exercise of
Congress‘s power to ―lay and collect Taxes.‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see
Govt.‘s Opening Br. 50–54. Like every other court to consider the issue, the
district court correctly rejected the government‘s argument. See Mead, 2011 WL
611139, at *22–*23; Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010, at *10–*12 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011);
Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88; Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv00015, 2010 WL 4860299, at *9–*11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); U.S. Citizens
Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10 CV 1065, 2010 WL 4947043, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
22, 2010); Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 890–91.
Whether the statutory penalty for not complying with the individual mandate
is a tax is ultimately irrelevant because Plaintiffs are challenging the mandate
itself, which is clearly not a tax. The ACA mandates that nearly every individual
in the United States ―shall … ensure that the individual … is covered under
minimum essential coverage‖ as defined by federal law. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)
(emphasis added). Congress then imposed a ―penalty‖ on any individual who
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―fails to meet the requirement‖ of that individual mandate.

§ 5000A(b)(1).

Plaintiffs‘ main constitutional challenge is to the mandate itself, which makes it
unlawful not to secure qualifying health insurance coverage; the ―penalty‖ for
failure to comply is invalid simply as a consequence of the mandate‘s invalidity.
See R.E. 387 n.3 (acknowledging that plaintiffs‘ ―challenge ‗is to the mandate
itself‘ and not the ‗incidental penalty that accompanies the individual mandate‘‖).
The cases cited by the Government are beside the point because they do not
involve the constitutionality of a regulatory prohibition or requirement, as opposed
to a tax. For example, United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950), involved
a tax on transferring a drug where the ―transfer is not made an unlawful act under
the statute‖ (emphasis added); instead of mandating or prohibiting any activity,
Congress simply taxed it. Similarly, in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
513 (1937), the Court emphasized that ―[t]he case is not one where the statute
contains regulatory provisions related to a purported tax in such a way as has
enabled this Court to say in other cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a
means of enforcing the regulations.‖ It would be unprecedented to uphold as a
valid exercise of the taxing power an act of Congress that on its face purports to
impose a direct regulatory mandate on individual conduct.
The distinction is not a mere formality; there are important differences
between a regulation directly mandating certain conduct and a tax encouraging that
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conduct. Most obviously, when Congress provides incentives through the tax
code, the choice whether to take advantage of those incentives remains with each
individual; but when Congress expressly mandates an action, law-abiding
individuals must comply.

Tax and regulatory legislation are also treated

differently under the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (―All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives ….‖). Finally,
whether a measure is structured as a tax or a regulation has tangible consequences
in terms of public perception and political accountability, as the district court
observed. R.E. 405.
Even if the classification of the penalty as a regulatory penalty or a tax
mattered, the district court correctly concluded that the structure and legislative
history of the ACA demonstrate that Congress made a deliberate choice to treat the
financial exaction in ACA § 1501(b) (§ 5000A(b)) as a regulatory penalty rather
than a tax. Among other things, Congress:
(i) specifically changed the term in previous incarnations of the
statute from ―tax‖ to ―penalty‖;
(ii) used the term ―tax‖ in describing several other exactions
provided for in the Act [but not the individual mandate];
(iii) specifically relied on and identified its Commerce Clause
power and not its taxing power;
(iv) eliminated traditional IRS enforcement methods for the
failure to pay the ―tax‖; and
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(v) failed to identify in the legislation any revenue that would
be raised from it, notwithstanding that at least seventeen other
revenue-generating provisions were specifically so identified.
R.E. 390–400; see also Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88.
Finally, the legislation would still be unconstitutional even if Congress had
not imposed a direct regulatory mandate and even if it had not chosen to treat the
penalty as a penalty rather than a tax. The taxing power is broad, but not so broad
as to eliminate constitutional limits on Congress‘s regulatory authority. Thus, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that ―the taxing power may not be used as the
instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to which
the Congress has no authority to interfere.‖ United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70
(1936).
While the Supreme Court has cut back on some of the limits it used to
impose on the taxing power, it has never abandoned, and instead has reaffirmed,
the principle that ―there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty
with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.‖ Dep’t of Rev. of Montana
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)).3 The Supreme Court certainly would not have upheld the

The Supreme Court‘s statement in a footnote in Bob Jones University v. Simon,
416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) that it had ―abandoned‖ ―distinctions between
regulatory and revenue-raising taxes‖ such as those drawn in Hill v. Wallace was
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federal intrusions into traditional State domains at issue in Lopez and Morrison if
Congress had simply imposed a ―tax penalty‖ for gender-motivated violence or
possession of a gun in a school zone. This Court need not reach that question,
however, because Congress expressly imposed a direct regulatory mandate, instead
of imposing only a tax on lawful conduct.
II.

The ACA’s Dramatic Expansion of the Medicaid Program Is Not a
Valid Exercise of Congress’s Spending Power.
The government does not argue that the Commerce Clause or the taxing

authority supports the ACA‘s dramatic expansion of the States‘ Medicaid burdens.
Nor does it deny that the expansion would ordinarily violate the Tenth
Amendment‘s prohibition against commandeering state governments. Instead, the
government resorts to the Spending Clause, arguing that the expansions are
constitutional conditions on the States‘ acceptance of federal funding.
Congress may not, however, employ its spending power to coerce States into
capitulating to federal demands. See Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590; Dole, 483
U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court has thus ―recognized that in some circumstances
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖ Dole, 482 U.S. at 211 (quoting
Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590). By conditioning all of the States‘ billions of
dictum that has been superseded by Kurth Ranch‘s recognition of the continued
viability of such distinctions.
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dollars of federal Medicaid funding on their adoption of the ACA‘s expanded
eligibility and coverage terms, Congress has plainly passed that point. No State
could afford to turn down all of its Medicaid money, which accounts for 40% of all
federal grant money, and there is no reasonable relationship between the changes
Congress seeks to impose and the withholding of all Medicaid funds. Congress
itself was so sure the States could not decline to continue participating in Medicaid
that it provided no other way for the neediest individuals to comply with the
individual mandate.
A.

The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Reiterated that Spending
Power Conditions Must Be Truly Voluntary.

―No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.‖ New
York, 505 U.S. at 178; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. Thus, although the
Supreme Court has ―identified a variety of methods … by which Congress may
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests,‖
Congress may not resort to ―outright coercion‖ to achieve that result. New York,
505 U.S. at 166.
To ensure that Congress may not use its spending power to circumvent that
limitation, the Supreme Court has admonished that when Congress conditions
acceptance of Federal funds upon adoption of a federal regulatory program, the
legitimacy of Congress‘s action ―rests on whether the State voluntarily and
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knowingly accepts the terms‖ Congress has attached to the funds. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (emphasis added). Though a
spending power condition is always in some superficial sense ―voluntary‖ —
Congress does not legally obligate States to accept federal funding — the Court
has made clear that a State‘s adoption of a federal regulation in exchange for
federal funding must be voluntary ―not merely in theory but in fact.‖ Dole, 483
U.S. at 211-12.
To that end, the Court has ―recognized that in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖ Id. at 211 (citing Steward Machine,
301 U.S. at 590); accord Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999). Although the Court has acknowledged the
difficulty inherent in determining ―the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590, it has never abandoned the
enterprise. See id. at 591 (―We do not fix the outermost line. Enough for present
purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.‖); Dole, 483 U.S.
at 211 (reaffirming coercion doctrine‘s existence before rejecting coercion claim
on the merits); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (similar). If the
coercion here does not cross the line, then the Court was simply mistaken to
identify any constitutional limit at all.
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The contours of the coercion doctrine are best illustrated by the Fourth
Circuit‘s en banc plurality opinion in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley.
There, the Federal government withheld all of a $60 million grant under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after Virginia refused to
provide services to a small number of individuals. See 106 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir.
1997). Although the court held that any requirement that those individuals be
provided with services was not unambiguously set forth in the statute as required
by Dole, id. at 567–68, a six-judge plurality went on to explain that there was also
a ―substantial‖ question whether the government‘s actions rendered Congress‘s
exercise of its spending power impermissibly coercive, id. at 569.
Judge Luttig‘s plurality opinion rejected the suggestion that courts are
incapable of determining when the sheer enormity of a federal inducement makes
it coercive, noting that ―[t]he difference between a $1000 grant and, as here, a $60
million grant, insofar as their coercive potential is concerned, is self-evident.‖ Id.
at 570. The plurality also pointed out that, ―in stark contrast‖ to Dole, where South
Dakota stood to lose only 5% of its funding if it rejected the condition in question
(the critical factor in the Supreme Court‘s analysis, see Dole, 483 U.S. at 211), the
Federal government withheld all of Virginia‘s IDEA funding, even though
Virginia‘s refusal to comply with the condition in question only affected a very
small portion of students ―for whom the special education funds were earmarked.‖
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Riley, 106 F.3d at 569. ―This is a condition considerably more pernicious than the
‗relatively mild encouragement‘ at issue in Dole.‖ Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
211).
Since Riley, the Fourth Circuit has reiterated its view that ―serious Tenth
Amendment questions would be raised‖ if Congress disproportionately conditioned
the entirety of a large federal grant upon a State‘s adoption of limited revisions to a
much broader program. West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
289 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting coercion claim based on finding that
government had not withheld or threatened to withhold State‘s entire Medicaid
grant); see also Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting) (four-judge dissent concluding that Congress
exceeded its Spending Clause powers because ―the proportion of federal funds for
education in Arkansas here placed at risk by the federal scheme (100%), the
amount of those funds (some $250,000,000), and the difficulty of making up for
the loss of those funds if the State elects not to [accept the condition] all lead to the
conclusion that pressure has turned into compulsion‖).
Following in the footsteps of Dole, these decisions correctly recognize that
the coercion doctrine focuses on both the size of the federal inducement and the
relationship between the condition and the inducement. The more massive the
amount of federal funding that Congress threatens to withhold, the greater the need
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for Congress to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the conditions and
the funds, lest Congress simply manipulate its power of the purse to coerce States
into capitulating to federal demands.
B.

Congress’s Conditioning of Billions of Dollars in Medicaid
Funding on States’ Acceptance of the ACA’s Expansion of
Medicaid Is Impermissibly Coercive.

Whether Congress employed impermissible coercion in the ACA is not a
close question; under any meaningful analysis, it did.

The ACA seeks to

significantly expand Medicaid eligibility and coverage. See pp. 6-8, supra. Yet
rather than simply hold out the promise of additional funding should States agree
to these expansions, Congress has threatened to withhold all Medicaid funding —
literally billions of dollars for most States — if States do not accept Congress‘s
terms. That is unquestionably coercive, as States quite literally cannot afford to
sacrifice billions in federal funds raised from the State‘s own residents, and
therefore have no real choice as to whether to accept these new conditions.
Medicaid is the single largest federal grant-in-aid program, accounting for a
staggering 40% of all federal funds paid to States and approximately 7% of all
federal spending. In 2008, the average State received well over $1 billion in
Medicaid funding; even the lowest recipient (Wyoming) received $246 million.
Cf. Riley, 106 F.3d at 570 (plurality opinion) (noting that ―the coercive potential‖
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of a $60 million grant ―is self-evident‖).4 States spend, on average, 20% of their
budgets on Medicaid expenditures, and federal funds cover at least half (oftentimes
more) of each State‘s costs. R.E. 1555. Florida, for example, currently devotes
26% of its entire state budget to Medicaid; if Florida lost federal funding, it would
have to devote more than 60% of all state tax revenues to Medicaid in order to
maintain existing, pre-ACA benefits. R.E. 493. Given the scale of that impact,
States have no meaningful choice between doubling the percentage of state tax
revenues dedicated to medical coverage and complying with additional strings
attached to those pre-existing federal funds. The federal funds are themselves
supplied by taxpayers in the State, so a State cannot simply take on the
responsibility and increase State tax revenues accordingly. Although the precise
impact of Medicaid funding differs from State to State, one thing is clear: the loss
of all Medicaid funding would be devastating to any State.

The federal

government does not – and could not – deny this basic reality.
Yet that is precisely what the ACA threatens.

The only discernable

relationship between the size of the federal inducement and the conditions the
ACA imposes is that the former leaves the States with no choice but to accept the
latter. That is not a reasonable relationship; it is unadorned coercion.
State-by-State Medicaid data was most recently published in 2008, when federal
spending totaled $192 billion. R.E. 1551–55. Federal Medicaid spending
increased by more than 30% (to $251 billion) in 2009 and is predicted to increase
by another $434 billion before the decade is over. R.E. 1425.
4
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That coercive effect was clear to Congress.

The ACA‘s otherwise

comprehensive scheme for universal health insurance provides no means other
than Medicaid through which the Nation‘s neediest residents might comply with
the mandate to maintain minimum health insurance coverage.

See ACA

§ 5000A(f)(1)(A). By predicating the individual mandate and its coverage of the
poorest citizens on the States‘ inability to withdraw from Medicaid, Congress
recognized that States could not realistically turn down the massive federal funds
at stake.
The constitutional violation is further illustrated by the fact that the ACA
does not simply (or even primarily) impose conditions on how the States spend
federal funds. The Act instead compels States to adopt, enforce, and even help
fund a comprehensive federal regulatory program — something Congress could
not otherwise do without running afoul of the Tenth Amendment commandeering
doctrine, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. To be sure, Congress can and often does use
its spending power to attempt to persuade States to adopt federal regulatory
programs. But when Congress pools massive amounts of federal resources into a
single lump sum that it threatens to withhold absent State capitulation, its actions
can no longer be characterized as simple persuasion, but instead constitute
―forbidden regulation in the guise of Spending Clause condition[s].‖ Riley, 106
F.3d at 569.
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C.

Neither the District Court Nor the Government Provided Any
Meaningful Response to the Merits of the States’ Coercion Claim.

In denying the government‘s motion to dismiss the States‘ coercion claim,
the district court recognized that, ―[i]f the Supreme Court meant what it said in
Dole and Steward Machine Co. (and I must presume that it did), there is a line
somewhere between mere pressure and impermissible coercion.‖ R.E. 434. The
court further recognized that, as shown by the facts detailed above, the States ―are
in an extremely difficult situation,‖ and the presence of coercion ―can perhaps be
inferred by the fact that Congress does not really anticipate that the states will (or
could) drop out of the Medicaid program.‖ Id. At the summary judgment stage,
however, the district court appeared to hold that the Supreme Court did not mean
what it said, and that coercion is not a valid legal theory. R.E. 2011. In doing so,
the court erroneously relied on a line of decisions from other circuits that largely
pre-dates and conflicts with the Supreme Court‘s most recent pronouncements on
the subject in Dole and other cases. R.E. 2011–13.
Before Dole, two circuits rejected the coercion doctrine after mistakenly
reading Steward Machine to foreclose any argument that the sheer enormity of a
federal inducement can render spending legislation coercive. See Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981); N.H. Dep’t of Employment Sec. v.
Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1980). As noted above, and as the district
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court appeared to acknowledge, the Supreme Court subsequently corrected that
misreading of Steward Machine in Dole. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
Nonetheless, three other circuits have since relied upon the reasoning of the
earlier court of appeals‘ decisions to foreclose coercion claims. See Kansas v.
United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d
593, 599 (8th Cir. 2003); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989).
The district court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Skinner, in
which Judge Reinhardt suggested, in obiter dictum, that coercion claims are
nonjusticiable. In support of that suggestion, the Ninth Circuit first relied upon
Schweiker‘s pre-Dole analysis, and then posited that the Supreme Court had
implicitly deemed coercion claims nonjusticiable in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which addressed the Tenth
Amendment commandeering doctrine, not the Spending Clause. Citing Garcia,
the Ninth Circuit theorized: ―The purpose of the coercion test is to protect state
sovereignty from federal incursions. If this sovereignty is adequately protected by
the national political process [according to Garcia], we do not see any reason for
asking the judiciary to settle questions of policy and politics that range beyond its
normal expertise.‖ Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448.
The Ninth Circuit‘s analysis is doubly flawed. First, the Supreme Court
decided Dole two years after it decided Garcia. Second, to the extent Garcia
56

suggested State sovereignty claims are categorically nonjusticiable, the Court
subsequently rejected that view in New York and Printz, both of which struck down
duly enacted federal statutes as unconstitutional federal incursions on State
sovereignty.

See New York, 505 U.S. at 177; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.

Accordingly, Skinner and the other decisions that followed it are inconsistent with
no fewer than three Supreme Court cases and provide no persuasive basis for
viewing coercion claims with suspicion. Unless and until the Supreme Court
abandons the coercion doctrine, courts are bound to apply it, and the district court
erred by failing to do so.
Nor has there ever been a stronger coercion claim than the one here, as
confirmed by the fact that all of the decisions that have rejected coercion claims on
their merits are readily distinguishable. Dole, for example, rejected a coercion
claim because Congress‘s attachment of a condition to 5% of federal highway
funds ($4 million) constituted only ―relatively mild encouragement.‖ Dole, 483
U.S. at 211. In West Virginia, the State failed to substantiate its allegation that the
federal government ―withh[e]ld (or threaten[ed] to withhold) the entirety‖ of its
Medicaid funding. 289 F.3d at 292. And in Steward Machine, the State ―d[id] not
offer a suggestion that … she was affected by duress.‖ 301 U.S. at 589.
In rejecting the States‘ claim, the district court invoked purported ―judicial
findings‖ that Medicaid is a voluntary program. R.E. 2010. But the cases the court
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cited only observed that States are under no legal obligation to participate in
Medicaid; they did not address whether Congress had coerced their participation.
See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990); Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.
Facilities v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998). Even if they
had, those decisions would have little bearing on this case. The States‘ claim is
that the ACA is impermissibly coercive because it conditions receipt of all
Medicaid funds on the ACA‘s expansions of Medicaid. The validity of that claim
can hardly be determined by reference to decisions that pre-date the ACA and its
expansions by more than a decade.
Finally, the district court stated that there is a ―factual dispute‖ about ACA‘s
financial impact on the States that ―cannot be resolved on summary judgment.‖
R.E. 2009. If there were a material dispute of fact on the application of the
coercion doctrine, that would only underscore the district court‘s legal error in
holding that coercion claims are per se invalid.5

The district court stated that two States ―acknowledged … that they can withdraw
from [Medicaid].‖ R.E. 2010. Those States acknowledged only that the ACA has
not eliminated the theoretical possibility of withdrawal; both made clear that
withdrawal is not an actual option. See R.E. 794 ¶16 (―Though theoretically
possible, South Dakota cannot cease participation in the Medicaid Program.‖);
R.E. 710 ¶2 (noting that ―Nevada can still consider opting out of Medicaid‖ but
withdrawal would be unaffordable).
5
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Ironically, however, the government‘s arguments help underscore the extent
of the coercion.

The government has argued, for example, that it will offer

additional funding to States that capitulate to its demands. That renders the ACA
more coercive, not less, as it increases the amount of funds States would forfeit —
funds obtained largely through federal taxes on States‘ residents — were they to
reject Congress‘s demands. Whatever ―the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590, the ACA has far surpassed it.
III.

The District Court Ordered Appropriate Relief.
A.

The Individual Mandate and Medicaid Reforms May Not Be
Severed from the ACA.

The district court correctly held that the unconstitutional individual mandate
is not severable from the rest of the ACA, and that the entire ACA must be
invalidated. R.E. 2075. The same is true of the coercive Medicaid amendments
for essentially the same reasons.6 Thus, the unconstitutionality of either of those
provisions is fatal to the entire ACA.
The government argues that the district court departed from settled legal
standards by striking down the ACA in its entirety even though many of its
provisions could operate in isolation, without the individual mandate. But the
The States also continue to maintain that the employer mandate and health
exchange benefit provisions violate the Tenth Amendment. Although the district
court dismissed those claims as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, R.E. 424–
25, the States reserve their right to challenge the Supreme Court‘s decisions in
Garcia and Hodel before the Supreme Court.
6
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―well established‖ severability doctrine does not turn on whether Congress could
have passed the remainder of the same act without the unconstitutional provision;
it instead asks whether Congress would have done so. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
Thus, whether constitutional provisions are capable of functioning without
an unconstitutional one is not the only — or even primary — factor in the
severance analysis.

―The more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is

whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress.‖ Id. at 685. When ―it is evident that the legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not,‖ the provisions may not be severed. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010)
(employing severance when ―nothing in the statute‘s text or historical context
makes it ‗evident‘ that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, would have preferred no [act] at all to‖ severance of the
unconstitutional provision) (citation omitted).
1.

The core health care reforms are not severable.

The district court correctly concluded that ―it is reasonably ‗evident‘ … that
the individual mandate was an essential and indispensable part of the health reform
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efforts, and that Congress did not believe other parts of the Act could (or it would
want them to) survive independently.‖ R.E. 2075. The ACA consists of five
central components. See Govt.‘s Opening Br. 13–15. In addition to the individual
mandate, the Act: (1) mandates the creation of health benefit exchanges to help
individuals and small businesses pool their purchasing power to obtain lower cost
insurance; (2) establishes employer mandates, penalties and incentives to expand
the availability of employer-sponsored insurance; (3) expands Medicaid eligibility
and coverage and offers tax credits to create affordable insurance options for those
with incomes up to 400% of the poverty level; and (4) bars insurers from denying,
canceling, capping, or increasing the cost of coverage based on an individual‘s preexisting conditions or coverage history.
As the government itself has emphasized, Congress intended each of these
core components, including the Medicaid expansion, to ―work[] in tandem‖ with
the individual mandate to make insurance more available and affordable.
R.E. 141. Indeed, when arguing that the individual mandate is constitutional, the
government has repeatedly asserted that ―Congress … concluded that the minimum
coverage provision is necessary to make the other regulations in the Act effective.‖
R.E. 143 (emphasis added); see also R.E. 999 (―the minimum coverage provision
forms an integral part of the ACA‘s larger reforms of health insurance industry
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practices‖).7

As the district court observed, the government referred to the

mandate ―as an ‗essential‘ part of the Act at least fourteen times in their motion to
dismiss.‖ R.E. 2065. Thus, the government is in no position to assert that the
mandate is severable.
The government‘s concessions were unavoidable because Congress plainly
intended the individual mandate to render the Act‘s insurance reforms more
affordable for the federal government, the States, and the insurance industry. As
Congress found, ―[b]y significantly increasing health insurance coverage and the
size of purchasing pools, which will increase economies of scale, the [mandate],
together with the other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce
administrative

costs

and

lower

health

insurance

premiums.‖

ACA

§ 1501(a)(2)(H). That makes the individual mandate the ―lynchpin of the entire
health reform effort.‖ R.E. 2068.
Conversely, the other reforms, including the Medicaid expansion, are
necessary to make insurance available to individuals covered by the mandate. As
the government has explained, many individuals covered by the mandate ―are
unable to obtain [insurance] without the insurance market reforms, tax credits,
cost-sharing, and Medicaid eligibility expansion that the Act will provide.‖ R.E.
To be clear, the States by no means concede that the Act‘s five core provisions
achieve that or any other goal Congress set forth. But the relevant question in the
severance analysis is how Congress intended the Act to function. See Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006).
7
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984–85.

Indeed, expanded Medicaid coverage is especially essential to the

viability of the individual mandate, because under the ACA, Medicaid is the only
way that the poorest of covered persons can comply with the mandate.
Accordingly, the government specifically conceded in the district court that
―the guaranteed issue and community rating insurance industry reforms in Section
1201 will stand or fall with the minimum coverage provision‖ because they are not
severable.

R.E. 1765.

There is no basis for suggesting that the mandate is

severable from some but not all of the core, interrelated health insurance reforms
— and the government is careful not to do so in this Court, and not to argue that
Congress would have enacted any of the ACA‘s core insurance reforms without
the individual mandate. As the district court determined, the government‘s broad
concession that ―the minimum coverage provision is necessary to make the other
regulations in the Act effective,‖ R.E. 143 (emphasis added), is fatal to any effort
to sever those regulations. R.E. 2069, 2074.
2.

The various other provisions of the Act are not severable.

The government‘s argument that some unidentifiable number of the Act‘s
other 450 provisions are severable, Govt.‘s Opening Br. 57, misses the mark. As
the district court explained, although the other individual tax provisions of the Act
might have ―no discernable connection to health care,‖ their inclusion was no
accident; they ―w[ere] intended to generate offsetting revenue‖ for the Act‘s costly
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central reforms. R.E. 2074. As the government aptly put it, ―[w]hen Congress
passed the ACA, it was careful to ensure that any increased spending, including on
Medicaid, was offset by other revenue-raising and cost-saving provisions.‖ R.E.
1024.
Thus, while the government identifies a handful of provisions that on their
face may appear to be unrelated to the Act‘s core components, see Govt.‘s Opening
Br. 56–57, it ignores that Congress carefully calibrated each provision to ensure
that the financial obligations the Act imposes are equivalent to the revenue and
savings it generates. Extracting the individual mandate — the centerpiece — from
the law would, of course, dramatically change its cost. But there would be no way
to determine which offsetting provisions of the ACA Congress would have
rewritten had the individual mandate not been included.
Moreover, once one recognizes that the central provisions of the ACA are
not severable, it is wholly unrealistic to expect the district court to sort through the
remaining 450 provisions to attempt to divine which Congress would have enacted
independently. That is a wholly artificial exercise once the core of the bill is
removed. And as the district court observed, ―[g]oing through the 2,700-page Act
line-by-line, invalidating dozens (or hundreds) of some sections while retaining
dozens (or hundreds) of others, would not only take considerable time and
extensive briefing, but it would, in the end, be tantamount to rewriting a statute….‖
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R.E. 2073–74. Even the government has not attempted to undertake that exercise
— it has only proffered some examples of provisions it asserts to be severable.
Because the government is essentially seeking to rescue Congress from the gamble
it intentionally employed by crafting the entire ACA around a provision of
questionable constitutionality, the district court correctly declined to ―‗substitute
the judicial for the legislative department of the government‘‖ by picking and
choosing among the ACA‘s various provisions. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (quoting
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)).8
The government‘s remaining criticisms of the district court‘s analysis are
equally unfounded.

It first accuses the court of attributing ―unwarranted

significance to the absence of a severability clause.‖ Govt.‘s Opening Br. 58. The
district court did no such thing. The court expressly recognized that ―‗the absence
of such a clause … ‗does not raise a presumption against severability.‘‖ R.E. 2068
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 186). What the court found significant was
Congress‘s removal of a severability clause from an earlier version of the bill — a
Washington State believes that one provision that is arguably different is ACA
section 10221, which reauthorized and amended the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act (IHCIA). The IHCIA pre-existed ACA, and section 10221
merely involved a reauthorization, which in turn had an independent legislative
genesis in S. 1790. Most tellingly, Native Americans served by the IHCIA are
exempted from the individual mandate by section 1501(b). But this only
underscores the difficulty of assessing the severability of the ACA‘s hundreds of
other miscellaneous provisions which do not address their relationship to the
individual mandate.
8
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version that the House had passed. That consideration is well within the bounds of
what the Supreme Court has recognized to be relevant evidence of congressional
intent. R.E. 2068 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983)).
In any event, that was but one factor in the district court‘s severability analysis,
which relied much more heavily on the court‘s conclusion that the Act ―cannot
function as originally designed‖ without the ―lynchpin of the entire health reform
effort‖: the individual mandate. R.E. 2074, 2068.
The government also identifies no error by noting that the district court‘s
severability ruling may ―affect the rights and obligations of parties not before the
Court.‖ Govt.‘s Opening Br. 60. Severance is a remedy for Congress‘s benefit,
not the plaintiff‘s. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). To the
extent there is any requirement that a plaintiff have standing to raise a severability
argument, that requirement is satisfied so long as the plaintiff is burdened by any
of the act‘s remaining provisions. Compare Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (declining to
address severance where no remaining provisions affected plaintiffs), with New
York, 505 U.S. at 186–87 (addressing severability where remaining provisions
affected plaintiffs).

The States plainly alleged injury in fact resulting from

multiple provisions of the Act, including the individual mandate, the Medicaid
expansions, and the employer mandates. Thus, the district court correctly reached
and resolved the severability question.
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B.

The District Court Correctly Included All Parties in its Judgment.

The government concedes that at least one of the individual plaintiffs has
standing to challenge the individual mandate, Govt.‘s Opening Br. 6 n.1, and it
does not dispute that the States have standing to challenge the expansion of
Medicaid. Nonetheless, the government asserts that the district court erred in
including the States within the scope of its declaratory relief concerning the
individual mandate. It is well settled, however, that so long as at least one plaintiff
has standing with respect to each claim, a court ―need not consider whether the
other … plaintiffs have standing.‖ Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977); accord Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
518 (2007); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Fund, 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981).
In any event, the States have standing to challenge the individual mandate
for at least three separate and independent reasons. First, the mandate requires all
individuals to maintain a minimum level of insurance, including individuals who
are either newly eligible for Medicaid or were previously eligible but had opted not
to enroll. As the government has recognized, the mandate will therefore require
millions more individuals to enroll in Medicaid, imposing millions of dollars in
additional costs on the States. Indeed, ―[o]f the additional 34 million people who
are estimated to be insured by 2019 as a result of the [individual mandate], a little
more than one-half (18 million) would receive Medicaid coverage due to the
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expansion of eligibility.‖ See Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the
―Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,‖ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs.,

Apr.

22,

2010,

at

6,

available

at

https://www.cms.gov/

ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf; R.E. 501 n.39.
That inevitability is not a product of ―unfettered choices made by
independent actors,‖ ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.), but is a necessary and intended consequence of the ACA, which
requires covered individuals to secure health insurance, and leaves Medicaid as the
only option for numerous low-income individuals to comply.
1501(b), 5000A(f)(1)(A).

See ACA §§

The States have therefore alleged a ―concrete and

particularized‖ injury that is ―fairly traceable‖ to the individual mandate and
redressed by the relief the district court granted. Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); see also Fla. State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v.
Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008) (―probabilistic harm is enough
injury in fact to confer standing‖) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, the States have standing because they have alleged that the
individual mandate renders the entire Act invalid on non-severability grounds. The
States have standing to raise that argument so long as they allege that any of the
Act‘s provisions causes them injury in fact, as such injury would be remedied by a
declaration that the Act is invalid. See Brock, 480 U.S. at 684 (adjudicating claim
68

that entire statute was invalid as a result of unconstitutional legislative veto
provision, where plaintiffs alleged injury based on other portions of the statute).
The States have plainly demonstrated injury in fact caused by the Medicaid and
employer mandate reforms, and therefore have standing to seek invalidation of the
Act on the ground that the individual mandate is unconstitutional.
Finally, as the district court found, the States have standing to challenge the
mandate as an impermissible incursion into their sovereign right to enact and
enforce legislation mandating that their citizens may not be compelled to purchase
insurance. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982) (recognizing sovereign‘s interest in its ―power to create and enforce a legal
code); Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(―States‘ sovereign interest in law enforcement is sufficient to support standing‖).
That theory of standing is not barred by Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), which held only that a State lacks standing when it demonstrates no ―quasi
sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened‖ by the statute in question. Id. at
485.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment below
invalidating the ACA in its entirety.
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